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Dynamic Innovation in a Two-Sided Platform
Abstract
We are interested in a two-sided platform, in which
dynamic innovation plays a role in stimulating con-
sumer demand that also drives firms’ incentive to
innovate. By explicitly modeling the price compe-
tition within the two-sided market, we study ways
consumers’ platform fee interacts with firms’ pric-
ing strategies on the platform. Our framework also
characterizes a dynamic R&D race and solves the
stationary Markov equilibrium using computation
methods. We find that by charging consumers a
fee, the platform is not necessarily better off, be-
cause firms may subsidize this cost by lowering their
prices in the market, which leads to lower trans-
action revenues and innovation rate. Platform’s
revenues may also suffer if it shares firms’ trans-
action revenues. Surprisingly, despite the platform
fee, consumer welfare improves as a result of lower
prices. However, these effects are not monotonic,
and shifts in the opposite direction occur when firms
switch to different pricing strategies, because con-
sumers’ platform fee also mitigates price competi-
tion between low- and high-quality firms.
1 Introduction
The two-sided market literature has explored
problems in network externality, platform’s alloca-
tion of cost between two sides of the market, and
social efficiencies, using static settings [13] [3] [10].
However, the recent explosion of two-sided app mar-
kets and other platform has been heavily driven by
innovative products. For example, the success of
Apple’s App Store1 and Google Android Market2
for mobile devices such as smartphones and wireless
tablets (e.g., the iPad), largely owes to the novelty,
variety, and quality of the apps created for them.
Market competition as well as innovation race play
increasingly important roles [1] [7] in “bringing both
sides on board” aside from platform pricing.
The market structure of two-sided markets ex-
hibits far more complexity than what has been as-
sumed in past studies. While consumers purchase
the mobile devices, the app developers pay a fee in
order to obtain the software development kit (SDK)
for coding apps. These costs are the prices for en-
rolling on the platform. The market for apps has
matured significantly since the first introduction of
iPhone. Paid apps now vary greatly in their quality
and prices. Consumers also have abundant infor-
mation to help them assess app quality, and have
different budget for purchasing apps.3 App devel-
opers face innovation decisions of whether to obtain
the SDK and the level of effort to invest to create an
attractive app. Consumers also continuously shop
for newer apps as more get listed in the app store.
Consumers are then interested in more than the
mere size of the developer network size, since the
rate at which quality apps are introduced to the
app market for their platform plays a major part
in their experience. App developers’ incentives to
innovate are also motivated by consumers demand
for newer apps and market profitability. Such ex-
ternality driven by continuous innovation has not
been well researched to our best knowledge. We
are interested in tying the innovation race among
the app developers with the microfoundation for
the price competition within the two-sided market.
Through modeling a dynamic problem and comput-
ing for the stationary Markov equilibrium, we offer
understanding on ways the platform fee (charged by
the platform to the consumers) impacts the econ-
omy of the market created by the platform.
When consumers pay a fee to use or purchase a
platform device, such cost may lower the prices of
goods sold on the platform, and, interestingly, mit-
igate price competition in the market in the mean-
time. The forces of competition cause firms to sub-
sidize consumers’ platform fee by lowering prices. In
particular, the higher quality firms cut their prices
more substantially than the lower quality firms,
which find leverage and compete less aggressively.
Consequently, consumer welfare improves despite
the result that the equilibrium innovation rate suf-
1The iPhone Developer Program, http : //developer.apple.com/iphone/program/.
2The Android Market, http : //market.android.com/support/bin/topic.py?hl = en&topic = 15866.
3Some would only stay with the free apps, while others are willing to buy more expensive one.
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fers. The latter effect is due to the reduction in
firms’ revenues, which serve as the main innova-
tion incentive. Lastly, while the platform gains from
higher fees charged to the consumers, it actually ex-
periences overall revenue loss as well if it obtains a
share from the revenues of market transactions.
While results due to pricecuts in the platform
market appear undesirable besides increasing con-
sumer welfare, we also discover that the mitigated
price competition may generate a boost over time.
The level of consumers’ platform fee indirectly de-
termines the market structure of the platform mar-
ket – significant increase of such cost can lead to
drastically different equilibrium pricing strategies.
As the lower quality firms perceive sufficient lever-
age created by consumers’ platform fee, equilibrium
prices of all firms will shift upward, resulting in a
less competitive market. In this case, firm revenues,
equilibrium innovation rate, and platform revenues
all have an upward shift.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We review related literature in Section 2. Section
3 describes our framework including the microfoun-
dation which characterize the price competition of
different qualities of goods in the platform market
and its equilibrium, and the dynamic innovation
race among potential entrants. We then explain our
computation approach and discuss the findings in
detail in Section 4. Lastly, we conclude.
2 Literature review
Among the studies on platform economy, a line
of interesting works have looked at the pricing prob-
lem of two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole exam-
ine the factors that determine how platforms allo-
cate the charges to the two sides of the market [12].
They find that characteristics of buyers, such as
degree of multihoming that generates a high sur-
plus, lead to more a favorable pricing structure [12].
Armstrong presents three models of different types
of competition between platforms based on whether
agents join one or several platforms [3]. The fee
structures of two-sided markets are studied by Cail-
laud and Jullien in [4], where the one-time regis-
tration fee and transaction prices could be intro-
duced. They derive the impact that different fee
structures have on platform competition and equi-
librium prices [4].
Other interesting questions on two-sided market
have also been explored. Hagiu [10] identifies a fun-
damental economic welfare trade off between two-
sided open platforms and proprietary platforms,
and shows that under certain circumstances propri-
etary platforms can be more socially desirable than
open platforms. Derdenger conducts an empirical
investigation of the issue of technological tie in the
video game industry using structural estimation and
finds that tying increases the console price competi-
tion [8]. All studies on two-sided markets thus far,
to our best knowledge, are limited by static mod-
eling, including structural estimation techniques in
the empirical work [8]. To gain a deeper under-
standing from another angle, We aim to take into
consideration inter-temporal elements that orches-
trate the dynamic innovation process and demand
on two sides of the market, in a system consisted of
a platform, app developers, and consumers.
Our interest coincides with the two-sided mar-
ket; but we offer a more elaborate analysis by build-
ing a framework that endogenizes the consumer net-
work size by the vertically differentiated product
market where sellers compete in price, and endo-
genizes the potential sellers’ innovation decisions.
Combined with analytical solutions, we use compu-
tation to explore a number of experiments address-
ing the issues of impact of platform pricing on in-
novation, platform revenue due to innovation, and
the market structure of the two-sided market. This
setup extends from a previous work by Lin et al. [11]
by incorporating platform prices and considering a
two-sided market, whereas [11] focuses on the rela-
tionship between income inequality and innovation
without the intervention of an intermediary in the
market.
Our study also contribute to the body of litera-
ture on innovation in industrial organization. Segal
and Whinston provide a dynamic model for ana-
lyzing antitrust policy and innovation [14], and as-
sume that a successful innovator enters the mar-
ket, receives an entrant’s profit in the first period,
and then becomes the monopolist if another inno-
vation enters the market. We offer an additional
dimension by endogenizing the market structure.
Without assuming a monopolistic market, we con-
sider a vertically differentiated market where incum-
bents’ profits are determined by the price competi-
tion. Moreover, several interesting studies have in-
vestigated simultaneously the effect of subsidies on
innovative and imitative technologies using growth
models [15] [5]. These works consider horizontally
differentiated innovative goods [9] [15] [5], whereas
we treat generations of innovations as vertically dif-
ferentiated based on the setting in [16]. The two
different perspectives allow for a more in-depth un-
derstanding of the role of R&D subsidies, which in
our case is a reduction in the platform price for in-
novating sellers.
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3 The model
In our dynamic problem, each discrete period
has the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In each period,
there exist two groups of firms differing in their ob-
jectives and actions. The incumbent firms compete
on price in the product market, into which the in-
novations are introduced as the latest generation or
the highest quality good; the potential entrants are
the firms making innovation decisions in the R&D
race. This section presents the model setup for the
price competition in each period and analyze firms’
pricing strategies and market segmentation based
on consumers’ preferences and platform prices. In
Section 3.4, we will analyze the firm’s innovation de-
cisions in the infinite horizon: The innovators, prior
to successfully innovating and entering the product
market, choose whether to enter the R&D race and,
if so, determine the equilibrium level of innovation
effort.
In Section 4, we solve for the stationary Markov
perfect equilibria of the dynamic programming
problem using computational methods. Assuming
firms do not collude, the pricing strategies in the
analysis here are part of the stationary Markov per-
fect equilibrium of the dynamic game.
3.1 Consumers
The setup here follows that of Shaked and Sut-
ton [16]. Consumers are heterogeneous in their bud-
get for purchasing products on the two-sided mar-
ket. Denote a consumer’s budget by the random
variable z, which follows the uniform distribution:
z ∼ U [z, z].
In each period, consumers observe the price set
by the platform, pb, and firms that produce verti-
cally differentiated, substitute goods as a result of
the innovation race, described in Section 3.4. De-
note k = 1, ..., n as the index for product quality,
where a higher k represents a higher quality.
The consumers are utility maximizing:
max U(z, k) = uk ∗ z
where uk = e
apiM (φ
I
−)k following [6]. Here u0 <
u1 < ... < un, and piM (φ
I
−) denotes the probability
of an innovation being introduced in the current pe-
riod. This captures the externality created by inno-
vation, such that when innovations occur at a higher
rate on a platform, consumers derive higher utility,
which leads to higher profitability for those firms
who successfully innovate. The functional form of
piM (φ
I
−) is described by Eq. (25) in Section 3.4.
Each consumer’s utility is defined by the utility for
consuming a certain quality good weighted by the
consumer’s remaining budget. Let Ck be the rela-
tive utility difference between products k and k−1,
and Ck > 1:
Ck =
uk
uk − uk−1 =
eapiM (φ
I
−)
eapiM (φ
I
−) − 1
= C.
Define zk as the indifference budget level, such
that the consumer with budget zk is indifferent be-
tween products k and k−1 at their respective prices.
So,
U(zk − pk − pb, k) = U(zk − pk−1 − pb, k − 1).
And note that if a consumer chooses to not pur-
chase, she does not pay the platform price pb; thus,
her utility would be U(z, 0) = u0 ∗z. From here, we
derive:
z1 = (p1 + pb)C1, (1)
zk = pk−1(1− Ck) + pkCk + pb. (2)
Then, consumers with taste z > zk have the prefer-
ence order (k, pk)  (k − 1, pk−1).
3.2 Market structure
Let the product cost be zero, the profit, or rev-
enue, of the k-th firm is:
R1 = p1(z2 − z), if z1 ≤ z (3)
R1 = p1(z2 − z1), if z1 ≥ z (4)
Rk = pk(zk+1 − zk), if 1 < k < n (5)
Rn = pn(z − zn). (6)
If n firms share the market and compete in price,
the first-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
For k = 1,
z2 − z − p1(C2 − 1) = 0, if z1 ≤ z (7)
z2 − z1 − p1[(C2 − 1) + C1] = 0, if z1 ≥ z (8)
For k = 2, ..., n− 1,
zk+1 − zk − pk[(Ck+1 − 1) + Ck] = 0 (9)
For k = n,
z − zn − pnCn = 0. (10)
Lemma 1. Let z < 4z−3pb, then in any Nash equi-
librium, at most two firms (of quality n and n− 1)
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obtain a positive market shares.
Proof. Assume there are more than two firms in
equilibrium, we can rewrite the FOCs using Eq. (1)
and (2) as,
zk+1 − 2zk − pk(Ck+1 − 1)− pk−1(Ck − 1) + pb = 0
z − 2zn − pn−1(Cn − 1) + pb = 0.
We can then get z+ pb > 2zn and zk+1 + pb > 2zk,
which yields 2zn + 2pb > 4zn−1, and then z+ 3pb >
4zn−1. By assumption, we have z < 4z − 3pb, so
4z > z + 3pb. Therefore, zn−1 < z, implying that
the top two firms cover the market.
Let us now define,
V =
u2 − u0
u2 − u1 =
C2 − 1
C1
+ 1. (11)
Applying Eq. (1) and (2), we have
p1 =
z1
C1
− pb (12)
p2 =
z2 + z1(V − 1)
C2
− pb (13)
Rewriting the FOCs yields, for firm 1
z2 = z + z1(V − 1)− pb(C2 − 1), if z1 ≤ z (14)
z2 = z1(V + 1)− pb(C2 − 1 + C1), if z1 ≥ z(15)
And for firm 2,
z − 2z2 = z1(V − 1)− pbC2. (16)
Figure 1: Firm 1’s First Order Conditions
Figure 1 plots firm 1’s FOCs showing different
regions. Different ranges of V values will result in a
certain market segmentation, in which market may
not be covered. Firm 2’s FOC is a decreasing func-
tion of z1. The point where it intersects firm 1’s
FOCs in figure 1 is the equilibrium. The result-
ing closed-form expression for two firms’ equilibrium
prices and profits can be derived. And these equi-
librium profits are the innovation rewards of the in-
novators, which we discuss in the following section.
3.3 Equilibrium revenues
Value of V determines the equilib-
rium regions, shown in the table below:
Region I V ≥ 13z [z + z + pb(3C2 − 2)]
Region II 13z [z + z + pb(3C2 − 2)] ≥ V
≥ 13z [z − z + pb(3C2 − 2 + 2C1)]
Region III 13z [z − z + pb(3C2 − 2 + 2C1)] ≥ V
Lemma 2. If 2z−pb(3C2−2) ≤ z ≤ 4z−3pb, then
a unique equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since z ≥ 2z − pb(3C2 − 2), the decreasing
function (16) crosses Figure 1 above z − pb(C2 − 1)
at z1 = 0. Thus, two firms’ first-order conditions
cross at one point. To verify that this is indeed
an equilibrium, we can show that both firms’ rev-
enue functions are concave in each firm’s own price
holding the competitor’s price constant. Therefore,
given 2z − pb(3C2 − 2) ≤ z ≤ 4z − 3pb, a unique
equilibrium exists.
In Region I, firms’ equilibrium prices and rev-
enues are,
p∗1 =
[z − 2z + pb(3C2 − 2)]
3C1(V − 1) − pb (17)
p∗2 =
1
3C2
[2z − z − pb] (18)
R∗1 =
p∗1
3
[z − 2z + pb] (19)
R∗2 =
1
9C2
[2z − z − pb]2 (20)
In Region II, the equilibrium results are,
p∗1 =
z
C1
− pb (21)
p∗2 =
1
2C2
[z + z(V − 1)− pbC2] (22)
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R∗1 =
p∗1
2
[z − z(V + 1) + pbC2] (23)
R∗2 =
1
4C2
[z + z(V − 1)− pbC2]2 (24)
In this paper, we omit the case under Region III.
We first focus on analyzing the scenario when the
market is covered – the feasible z values such that
the equilibrium occurs in Regions I or II.4
3.4 Innovating firms
This section describes the innovation race and
firms’ innovation decisions. Potential entrants make
decisions in three stages: 1) Entry to the innovation
race – firms choose whether to innovate by taking
into account the platform price, f , which is also
the fixed innovation cost, and the expected value of
innovating; 2) Innovation effort – firms choose the
level of R&D, which affects their probability of suc-
cessful innovation and hence the probability of mar-
ket entry; 3) In case of market entry, firms choose
their prices, which are described in the previous sec-
tion. Our setup follows the framework developed by
Segal and Whinston [14] with the extension of het-
erogeneity of innovation costs across firms.
There exist M firms that are potential entrants.
These firms compete in the R&D race. They have
to pay the cost of innovation, which is c(φi). As-
sume the cost function c(·) is convex. φi ∈ (0, 1)
is the innovation rate of firm i, and also firm i’s
probability of creating a new product.
Multiple innovators may succeed in developing
new products. However, only one of these innova-
tions is sufficiently competitive to be listed in the
two-sided market. This successful firm then be-
comes an incumbent producing the currently high-
est quality product in the market. We use the si-
multaneous entry and exit setup; thus, the lowest
quality incumbent is pushed out of the market when
a new firm enters. The innovation model connects
to the market structure analysis at this point, as
the post-innovation rents are characterized by the
equilibrium market structure.
Let pi(φI−) denote the probability of at least
one firm successfully creating a new product, where
φI− ∈ [0, 1]N describes the innovation efforts of all
potential entrants. Because in each period only one
of these firms is granted a patent and enters the
market, the probability of actually obtaining the
patent is denoted by λ(φ, φ−), where φ− ∈ [0, 1]N−1
is the innovation efforts of the rest of the innova-
tors. In a symmetric equilibrium, firms with the
same draw will make the same decision. Thus, we
only consider whether both low- and high-cost firms
choose to innovate. Both pi(φI−) and λ(φ, φ−) have
different formulations when either all the firms in-
novate or only one type of firms innovate. Thus, we
analyze these formulations case by case. Also note
that the number of innovating firms also affects con-
sumers’ utility through network externality.
The probability of at least one firm successfully
creating a new product among M potential entrants
is denoted by piM (φ
I
−), where:
piM (φ
I
−) = 1− (1− φ−)M . (25)
Among M potential entrants, conditional on suc-
cessful innovation, the probability of entering the
market for any one firm is denoted by rM (φ−):
rM (φ−) =
1− (1− ψ−)N
ψ− ·N (26)
The probability of obtaining a patent for this firm
is λM (φ, φ−):
λM (φ, φ−) = φrM (φ−). (27)
Following [14] we use the dynamic programming
approach to formulate this problem and look for
the stationary Markov perfect equilibria. The value
functions of the innovating firms are listed below:
V 0(φ−) = max{0,−f + V E(φ−)}; (28)
V E(φ−) = max
φ
{λ(φ, φ−)V IJ
+(1− λ(φ, φ−))βV 0(φ−)
−c(φ)}; (29)
V Ii (φ−) = Ri + βpi(φ
I
−)V
I
i−1(φ−)
+β(1− pi(φI−))V Ii (φ−), (30)
i = 2, ..., J ;
V I1 (φ−) = R1 + βpi(φ
I
−)V
0(φ−)
+β(1− pi(φI−))V I1 (φ−). (31)
V 0(φ−) is the value function of potential en-
trants at the start of each stage game; V E(φ−) is
the value function of entrants in the R&D race; and
V Ii (φ−) and V
I
1 (φ−) are the value functions for in-
cumbents producing product quality i and the low-
est quality product before exiting, respectively. We
show that the dynamic programming problem de-
scribed by Eq. (28) through (31) satisfies the Black-
4Our results here are then more applicable to platforms where consumers derive little value from the platform itself without
transacting with firms on the platform.
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well sufficient conditions; thus, it has a unique fixed
point in a bounded space.
Lemma 3. The dynamic programming problem
characterized by Eq. (28) through (31) has a unique
fixed point.
Proof. We need to show that the problem defined
by Eq. (28) through (31) satisfies Blackwell suffi-
cient conditions. The problem of interest can be
written as follows:
V 0(φ−) = max{0,−f + V E(φ−)}
V E(φ−) = max
φ
{ λ
1− β(1− pi)R2
+
λβpi
(1− β(1− pi))2R1 − c(φ) + β˜V
0(φ−)}
where β˜ ≡ ( βpi1−β(1−pi) )2λ+ (1− λ)β.
We are interested in the stationary Markov
Equilibria (see Segal and Whinston (2007) for a sim-
ilar model). Thus two sets of strategies are com-
pared. In the first case, the potential entrant al-
ways enters the R&D race. In the second case, the
potential entrant never enters the race. In the for-
mer case, the dynamic programming problem can
be written as follows:
V 0(φ−) = max
φ
{−f + λ
1− β(1− pi)R2
+
λβpi
(1− β(1− pi))2R1 − c(φ) + β˜V
0(φ−)} (32)
We need to prove the above dynamic programming
problem satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficient condi-
tions. Let X = X1 × . . . XM−1, Xi = [0, 1],i ∈
{1, . . .M−1}. B(X) is a space of bounded functions
f : X → R. Define the operator T : B(X)→ B(X)
as follows:
Tv(φ−) = max
φ
R˜(φ) + β˜v(φ−)
Where R˜(φ) = −f + λ1−β(1−pi)R2 +
λβpi
(1−β(1−pi))2R1 − c(φ).
1) monotonicity.
Pick ∀f, g ∈ B(X), f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ X.
Want to Show (Tf)(x) ≤ (Tg)(x) for all x ∈ X. Let
φ1 = argmax{R˜(φ)+ β˜f(x)};φ2 = argmax{R˜(φ)+
β˜g(x)};
(Tf)(x) ≤ R˜(φ1) + β˜g(x) ≤ (Tg(x))
2) Discounting. ∀x ∈ X;
T (v + a)(x) = max
φ
R˜(φ) + β˜(v(x) + a) (33)
= max
φ
R˜(φ) + β˜v(x) + β˜a (34)
= max(Tv)(x) + β˜a. (35)
Now we need to prove β˜ < 1. As ( βpi(1−β(1−pi)) )
2 <
1,β < 1, β˜ < 1. So the dynamic programming prob-
lem (32) has a unique fixed point. Denote the so-
lution as V ∗(φ−). Given φ−, if V ∗(φ−) > 0, to
enter the race is optimal. Otherwise, the potential
entrant will exit the race. Thus the problem de-
scribes in the text has a unique fixed point v∗∗(φ−).
When V ∗(φ−) > 0, v∗∗(φ−) = V ∗(φ−); Otherwise,
v∗∗(φ−) = 0.
In a symmetric stationary equilibrium of inter-
est, the firms with the same shocks have the same
innovation rate. Obviously, the firms do not inno-
vate if they are not in the market. A potential en-
trant observes its competitors’ action and its type,
then decides whether to enter the R&D race, and
identifies its optimal R&D efforts. In equilibrium,
its decision should be the same as that of other firms
with the same shocks.
4 Computational findings
4.1 Parameterization
Because of the complexity of the dynamic prob-
lem, we use computation methods to find the nu-
merical solutions to the problem described by Eq.
(28) through (31). In particular, given φ−, we
solve this problem using the value function itera-
tion method and derive the policy function φ(φ−).
We then evaluate the distance between the derived
innovation rate φ(φ−) and the original guess and
update the φ− to find the solutions of these equa-
tions.5 We also try a large set of initial guesses to
check whether there may exist multiple equilibria.
Our computation results are robust under different
initial guesses.
The discount rate β = 0.95 implies the annual
interest rate is approximately 5%. a in the utility
function is 2.2. The income of consumers follows a
uniform distribution U [z, z]. The upper bound of
taste shock z is 4.2, while the lower bound of the
taste shock z is 1.7. The price that firms pay to the
platform , f , is set to 0.01. As for the functional
form of innovation cost c(·), we follow Aghion, et
al.’s model and use quadratic form, c() = φ2 [2].
5We use the “fsolve′′ function in Matlab to solve this system of equations.
Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2011
6
 = 12 We also assume the number of potential
entrants is 10 each period. We set these numbers
relatively small to reduce the computation load.
4.2 Results
In all the following numerical experiments, we
have found values of pb that cover both equilibrium
regions. Equilibrium Region I depicts a highly com-
petitive market, where the quality gap between the
two firms is relatively narrow. Thus, the low quality
firm prices below the valuation of the lowest-budget
consumer. In Region II, the quality gap between the
firms is wider, thus the low quality firm only prices
low enough to cover the market resulting in higher
equilibrium prices from both firms. Figure 1 shows
that increasing pb lowers the cutoff of the adjacent
regions. The additional premium pb makes the low
quality firm the preferred choice for consumer who
would otherwise choose the high quality firm if pb
is not imposed; therefore, as pb increases, the low
quality firm more easily forgoes the price cutting
strategy – price competition is mitigated and two
firms are more easily engaged in Region II pricing
strategy.
Referring back to Eq. (12) and (13), we can
see that although pb is charged to consumers by
the platform, it appears to reduce the prices of the
transacted goods paid by consumers to the firms.
However, it is not clear that firms actually bear
(even a part of) pb for consumers in such equilib-
rium, because values of C1, C2, and V are endoge-
nous in the innovation rate. In other words, if pb
affects the equilibrium innovation–which it does as
discussed in the following–then values of the other
parameters will also be different; hence, the values
of p1 and p2 in equilibrium may or may not be lower
as pb increases.
We first investigate the changing price gaps of
pb, p
∗
1, and p
∗
2 in the stationary Markov equilibrium,
where p∗1 and p
∗
2 are determined such that innovat-
ing firms are optimizing their innovation rates at
different levels of pb and consumers’ purchase de-
cisions are based on pb and the optimal innovation
rates. Figure 2 shows three price gaps from Region
I to Region II (a jump is observed between the two
regions around pb = 0.15).
In Region I, while the high quality firm indeed
subsidizes part of pb, the low quality firm not only
does not compensate consumers for pb, it actually
increases p1 further as well. Increasing pb gives the
low quality firm leverage by shifting demand from
the high quality firm to the low quality firm. As
a result, the price competition is mitigated, as the
high quality firm attempts to “pay back” to its con-
sumers while the low quality firm lifts up its price
level.
Figure 2: Price gaps
When pb reaches a point, two firms both experi-
ence a price surge due to change of pricing strategy
in entering Region II, where quality levels are suf-
ficiently wide such that low quality firm only price
low enough to cover the market. In this region, both
p∗1 and p
∗
2 decrease as pb goes up, meaning the low
quality firm also subsidizes consumers for pb as the
low quality firm continues to do so. In this compet-
itive setting, increasing pb poses a threat to the low
quality firm as well, which can easily lose consumers
who would decide to not purchase at all. As the
graph shows, the high quality firm still subsidizes
more than the low quality firm because of demand
shift from the former to the latter.
In terms of firm revenues, increases in pb bene-
fit the low quality firm at the expense of the high
quality firm in both regions. The low quality firm
receives higher revenue gain in Region I compared
to Region II due to the increase in both equilibrium
price and demand.
Figure 3:Low- and High-Quality Firm Revenues
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pb indirectly impacts the equilibrium innovation
rate through the revenue effect shown in Figure 3.
Higher pb implies that for successful entrants ini-
tial revenues as the high quality firm is reduced but
later revenues as the low quality firm (when another
innovator enters) will increase. As Figure 4 indi-
cates, the overall effect of revenue changes on the
innovation incentives is negative. Thus, higher fees
imposed by the platform on consumers may reduce
the innovation rate, because the market created by
the platform transfers sufficient level of this fee onto
firms, which in turn diminishes the innovation prize.
Figure 4: Innovation Rate and Probability of Entry
When innovating firms innovate at a lower inten-
sity due to pb, the probability for introduction of an
innovation is also adversely affected. This implies
that the platform may experience a slower market
turnover rate – successful innovators enjoy longer
market incumbency at lower revenues due to pb,
and consumers obtain less novel products over time.
Consumers’ preference is then affected by such mar-
ket turn over rate. Figure 5 explores the effect of pb
on consumer welfare, as a result of the impact of pb
on other factors in this innovation process.
Figure 5: Consumer Welfare and Platform Revenues
Consumers face two opposing effects from in-
creasing pb. As discussed earlier, higher pb leads to
possible price subsidies born by firms in the market,
hence lower product prices. However, the resulting
less rapidly innovative market (lower probability of
product entry) diminishes consumers’ utility. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the positive effect dominates the
negative effect in both Region I and II. Consumers
benefit more from lower prices than the loss due to
reduced innovation rate. However, note that there
is a significant drop from Region I to II, because pb
also mitigates firms’ price competition and causes
the transition to Region II where equilibrium prices
are much higher. Therefore, as an unexpected find-
ing, platform’s fee, pb, for consumers actually im-
proves consumer welfare, but only within each re-
gion.
Lastly, we shift focus on the effect of pb on plat-
form’s own revenues. We suppose platform obtains
revenues from the fee pb imposed on consumers, the
fixed cost f charged on innovating firms, and a share
of the revenues from the transactions in the market
(Eq. (19) (20) (23) and (24)). We use the ratio
30/70, as in platform collects 30% and firms collect
70% of the equilibrium revenues, since that is the
common split used by Amazon for Kindle books,
Apple and Google for Android apps. While increas-
ing pb clearly adds to platform’s revenues, the down-
side is the reduction in innovation rate as well as
lower market revenues, which platform obtains 30%
of. As a result, the platform’s revenues are actually
decreasing in pb for both regions; however, similar
to previous findings, a jump occurs at the transi-
tion from Region I to Region II, due to improved
revenues in Region II.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize the network ex-
ternality of a two-sided platform by connecting
firms’ innovation with consumers’ utility. In ef-
fect, we study the interaction of fees imposed by
the platform and the pricing of goods inside the
platform market. Our framework introduces a dy-
namic problem that describes the innovation race of
the innovating app developers and explicitly models
the price competition among incumbents that pro-
duce vertically differentiated apps. Contradictory
to conventional wisdom, we find that increasing con-
sumers’ platform fee leads to higher consumer wel-
fare, because such cost may be subsidized by firms
on the platform as a result of competition. Con-
sequently, firms’ revenues are reduced, which fur-
ther impacts the equilibrium innovation rate and
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platform revenues negatively. However, increasing
consumers’ platform fee also dampens the platform
market competition, as the low quality producer
finds a leverage from the demand shift; such dynam-
ics will eventually lead to a different equilibrium of
a less competitive market, where consumers’ wel-
fare may suffer from elevated prices. The innova-
tion rate and revenues then benefit from such equi-
librium switch.
Our work suggests that membership pricing for
two sides of a platform should take into consider-
ation its effect on the economy of the market cre-
ated by the platform, especially when revenues of
the transactions are split between the platform and
its members. The cost of consumer platform fee
or purchase of the platform hardware device re-
stricts consumers’ budget for purchases in the mar-
ket. Prices of market goods, such as Kindle-version
books and smartphone or iPad apps, are then dis-
counted driven by market competition. Such evi-
dence is commonly observed in related industries.
For example, Kindle-version books are priced at a
substantially lower price than hardcopy books.
Our results also indicate that consumer platform
fee also serves as a device to mitigate competition
by providing the lower quality firms some leverage
in competition with the higher quality firms. In-
tuitively, as consumer income shifts down, or over-
all prices shift up, consumers would resort to lower
quality goods that are more affordable. Increasing
consumer platform fee has a similar effect. The
higher quality firms then subsidizes such costs for
consumer to a higher degree than the lower quality
firms (if they subsidize at all). Substantial reduc-
tion in competition intensity may eventually lead
to a drastic change in firms’ pricing strategy, which
results in considerably higher prices, benefits plat-
form and firms’ revenues, but lowers consumer wel-
fare. Such connection offers the implication that
platform’s pricing of fees may indirectly determine
the market structure, under which goods are trans-
acted.
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